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LETTERS
cause many ARVs are poultry patho-
gens of economic importance, more 
studies are needed to determine the 
taxonomic classiﬁ  cation of the TVAV 
isolate and its pathogenicity for avian 
hosts. In addition, the recognition of 
potential avian pathogens in wild birds 
is important due to the possible threat 
for farm-raised birds and also for the 
surveillance of zoonotic viruses trans-
missible to humans.
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Avian Inﬂ  uenza A  
(H5N1) 
To the Editor: This letter is in re-
sponse to a recently published article 
about statistical modeling to assess hu-
man-to-human transmission of avian 
inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) viruses in 2 case 
clusters (1). Sporadic cases and clusters 
of human infection with highly patho-
genic avian inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) viruses 
have occurred after direct contact with 
diseased or dead poultry (2,3). Limited, 
nonsustained human-to-human trans-
mission of avian inﬂ  uenza  (H5N1) 
viruses is believed to have occurred 
in some clusters (4). Every human in-
fection with a novel inﬂ  uenza A virus 
should be investigated, and suspected 
clusters should be investigated imme-
diately to assess exposures and trans-
mission patterns.
Yang et al. applied a statistical 
model to evaluate publicly available 
data from 2 case clusters of human in-
fection with avian inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) 
viruses (1). These clusters were investi-
gated in detail during 2006 by ﬁ  eld epi-
demiologic investigation teams. Yang 
et al. suggest that statistical methods 
can prove or conﬁ  rm human-to-human 
transmission, but this suggestion is 
misleading. Modeling approaches can 
suggest transmission modalities to ac-
count for case patterns, but determina-
tion of human-to-human transmission 
requires detailed ﬁ  eld  epidemiologic 
investigations in which human, animal, 
and environmental exposures as well 
as clinical and laboratory data are as-
sessed and interpreted.
Indication that a novel inﬂ  uenza A 
virus has acquired the ability to spread 
among humans could be reﬂ  ected by 
a change in the epidemiology of clus-
ters, such as increases in 1) size and 
frequency of clusters, 2) cases among 
nonrelated persons, and 3) clinically 
mild cases. This ability could also be 
reﬂ  ected in accompanying changes in 
viruses isolated from case-patients. 
When facing emerging infectious dis-
ease threats such as those posed by 
highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza A 
(H5N1) viruses, surveillance should 
rapidly detect human cases and case 
clusters and facilitate accurate identi-
ﬁ  cation of the agent. Field epidemio-
logic investigations, initiation of evi-
dence-based clinical management of 
case-patients, and epidemiologic dis-
ease-control methods (including ap-
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propriate infection control measures) 
should be implemented immediately. 
Statistical modeling can provide use-
ful and supportive insights but should 
not be viewed as an alternative to a 
detailed ﬁ  eld epidemiologic investiga-
tion combined with laboratory data. 
Timely and comprehensive ﬁ  eld inves-
tigations remain most critical to guid-
ing decisions about containment ef-
forts for pandemic inﬂ  uenza and other 
emerging infectious diseases (5).
Timothy M. Uyeki* 
and Joseph S. Bresee*
*Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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In Response: We thank Drs 
Uyeki and Bresee for their thoughtful 
commentary (1) on our article about 
assessing the possibility of human-to-
human transmission of avian inﬂ  uenza 
A (H5N1) in observed clusters (2). We 
agree with them that statistical models 
are not substitutes for careful epidemi-
ologic investigations combined with 
laboratory data. We believe that the 
statistical model that we advance can 
be an important tool to use in conjunc-
tion with sound and rapid epidemio-
logic investigation and intervention. 
We do not claim, however, that 
our statistical model can prove or con-
ﬁ  rm human-to-human transmission, as 
Uyeki and Bresee state. In our article, 
we were careful to point out that we 
found statistical evidence of human-
to-human transmission (p = 0.009) 
in Sumatra. We did not claim to have 
proven or conﬁ  rmed human-to-human 
transmission on the basis of our statis-
tical analysis. A strict interpretation of 
what we found is that the data from the 
cluster in northern Sumatra provided 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
of no human-to-human transmission. 
Given this, we then weighed all the 
epidemiologic and laboratory infor-
mation available to make a scientiﬁ  c 
judgment about the likelihood of hu-
man-to-human transmission. We are 
not aware of any logical system analo-
gous to Koch’s postulates (3) (i.e., 
proving the causal link between an 
infectious agent and clinical disease) 
for actually proving that an infectious 
agent is transmitted from person to 
person. However, we believe that the 
statistical, epidemiologic, and labora-
tory evidence combined weigh heavily 
toward the presence of limited human-
to-human transmission in the case of 
the Sumatra cluster. 
This statement can be contrasted 
with our analysis of the cluster in 
eastern Turkey, where we did not ﬁ  nd 
statistical evidence of human-to-hu-
man transmission of avian inﬂ  uenza A 
(H5N1). This analysis must be evalu-
ated with the epidemiologic and labo-
ratory data. We simply state that we do 
not have enough statistical evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis of no hu-
1970  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 12, December 2007man-to-human spread. Whether hu-
man-to-human transmission occurred 
is a scientiﬁ  c judgment. 
We agree with Uyeki and Bresee 
that statistical modeling can provide 
useful and supportive insights, and we 
hope that epidemiologic teams who 
investigate and control potential in-
fectious disease outbreaks will carry 
the TranStat software (2) into the ﬁ  eld 
with them. We are grateful that Uyeki 
and Bresee point out that immediate 
implementation of containment mea-
sures is critical, even while we sort 
out the cause of an observed cluster 
of cases. Actually containing possible 
spread of a potential pandemic strain 
of inﬂ  uenza (4,5) is more important 
than scientiﬁ   c arguments about the 
transmissibility of the infectious agent 
in question.
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ANOTHER DIMENSION
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Swimming With A Hundred Year Old 
Snapping Turtle
Freya Manfred
I spy his head above the waves,
big as a man’s ﬁ  st, black eyes peering at me, 
until he dives into darker, deeper water.
Yesterday I saw him a foot from my outstretched hand, 
already tilting his great domed shell away.
Ribbons of green moss rippled behind him, 
growing along the ridge of his back 
and down his long reptilian tail.
He swims in everything he knows,
and what he knows is never forgotten.
Wisely, he fears me as if I were the Plague, 
which I am, sick unto death, swimming 
to heal myself in his primeval sea.
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